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"THIS NEW AND BEAUTIFUL ORGANISM":
THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM IN THREE STATE SUPREME
COURTS
JOSEPH A. RANNEY*

The integrity of the union has been tried. The integrity of the states is
on trial. Much rests upon the moderation and forbearance of the
federal courts; as much perhaps upon the firmness of the state courts,
refusing to abdicate state authority, in state matters, to assumption of
federal jurisdiction. We will faithfully try to do our part.
-Chief Justice Edward Ryan (Wisconsin), 1876'
This new and beautiful organism is yet in the course of practical
development, which may soon prove whether its fundamental
equilibrium of local and national power is in most danger of
disturbance from the centrifugal tendencies of the States, or the
centripetal attractions of the central government.
-Chief Justice George Robertson (Kentucky), 18652

I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the state and federal governments has been a regular
subject of legal and political controversy since the American Revolution.3
* B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., Yale Law School; Attorney, DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C.,
Madison, Wisconsin; Adjunct Professor, Marquette Law School.
1. State ex rel. Drake v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 175, 217 (1876), rev'd sub noma.Doyle v. Cont'l Ins.
Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876).
2. Griswold v. Hepburn, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 20, 23 (1865), rev 'd in part and aff'd in part, 75 U.S.

(8 Wall.) 603 (1870), overruled by Second Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871); see
infra note 198.
3. See, e.g., WALTER H. BENNETT, AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM passim (1964);
FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776-1876 passim
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Historians and jurists have devoted substantial attention to the debates
between federalists and anti-federalists over the creation and ratification of the
United States Constitution, 4 the conflict between the Jackson administration
and South Carolina over that state's attempt to "nullify" a federal tariff law in
1832, 5 and the role that the states' rights doctrine played in the chain of events
leading to the Civil War. 6 Studies of Southern resistance to federal
desegregation efforts during the mid-twentieth century 7 and of recent
decisions of the Rehnquist Court, arguably favoring the states against
8
Congress, have triggered renewed interest in the dilemmas of federalism.
It is a truism that federalism underwent a fundamental change during and
after the Civil War, that Americans developed a heightened sense of national
union, and that federal power expanded dramatically at the expense of the
states. 9 But there are surprisingly few studies of the legal and psychological
mechanisms that facilitated that transition, particularly at the state level.' ° Did
state supreme courts actively resist federal expansion before, during, and after
the Civil War era, or did they cooperate with federal lawmakers and judges?
Have state courts led the way in fostering states' rights sentiment, or have
they acted as a check on such sentiment?
This Article makes a beginning attempt to address these questions by
comparing judicial approaches to federalism in three states: Wisconsin,
Georgia, and Kentucky. These states were selected as exemplars of the three
sections involved in the Civil War (the North, the South, and the border slave
states), and one might predict they would illustrate the entire spectrum of
(2000).
4. See

generally

I

FEDERALISTS

AND

ANTIFEDERALISTS:

THE

DEBATE

OVER

THE

RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffier eds., 2d ed. 1998); THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). For a compilation of anti-federalist
writings, see generally the seven-volume set THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing
ed., 1981).
5. See ROBERT V. REMINI, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 233-51 (1987).

6. See 6 JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 229-49
(1988).
7. See I I NUMAN V. BARTLEY, A HISTORY OF THE SOUTH: THE NEW SOUTH, 1945-1980, at

159-60 (Wendell H. Stephenson & E. Merton Coulter eds., 1995).
8. See, e.g., McDONALD, supra note 3, at 230-33; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative"
Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002); Peter J. Smith,
States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1 (2003).
9. 6 MCPHERSON, supra note 6, at 323-25, 442-48, 859-62.
10. One preeminent modem legal historian, Morton Hurwitz, stated in 1977 that American
legal history could be divided into three periods: the period before 1860, the decade of 1860-1870,
and the period since 1870. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960, at vii-viii (1992). Horwitz has written books about the prewar period and the period
since the war, but no one has yet written a comprehensive legal history of the Civil War decade. See
id; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
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states' rights sentiments in America. Wisconsin was a staunch anti-slavery
state and generally has been in the mainstream of national economic
development." Georgia was one of the first states to secede and one of the
first to overthrow federal Reconstruction efforts after the war; it did not join
the economic mainstream until the mid-twentieth century. 12 Kentucky falls
between these two states: It had close cultural and economic ties to both the
North and South before and after the Civil War, but despite resentment of
wartime Union occupation and a growing realization that the war would mean3
the end of slavery, the state remained loyal to the Union throughout the war.'
The Article begins by examining the early evolution of federalism in each
state. Kentucky and Georgia experienced several episodes of near open
rebellion against the federal government before the Civil War. In 1798,
Kentucky led a protest against the federal Alien and Sedition Acts, and in the
early 1820s, it protested and resisted a Supreme Court decision that
jeopardized the land holdings of many of its citizens. 14 Georgia's resistance
to an adverse 1792 Supreme Court land title decision led to a constitutional
amendment limiting federal power, and in the early 1830s, the state
successfully ignored several Supreme Court decisions that impeded its Indian
But the Kentucky and Georgia Supreme Courts,
removal policy.' 5
particularly Kentucky's, acted as moderating forces throughout the prewar
period. Wisconsin, like many Northern states, experienced a wave of antifederalist sentiment in reaction to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, but
Wisconsin was the only state whose supreme court 6led a revolt against the
federal law rather than trying to moderate opposition.'
The Article next examines the effect that war and Reconstruction had on
federalist sentiment in each state and the role each state's supreme court
played in shaping such sentiment. Strikingly, the Wisconsin court's antifederalist streak did not end when the state's cause prevailed in the war.
During the late 1860s and early 1870s, a divided court criticized and
attempted to invalidate several federal removal laws that it viewed as a threat

11.

See ROBERT C. NESBIT & WILLIAM F. THOMPSON, WISCONSIN: A HISTORY 235-46, 267-

79, 313-35, 499-523 (2d ed. 1989).
12. See ALAN CONWAY, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GEORGIA passim (1966).
13. See E. MERTON COULTER, THE CIVIL WAR AND READJUSTMENT IN KENTUCKY passim

(1926).
14. See infra notes 28-40 and accompanying text. For the sake of economy of expression, the
United States Supreme Court is referred to in this Article as "the Supreme Court" or "the Federal
Supreme Court"; references to state supreme courts include the name of the state in question unless
the identity of the state is clear from the context.
15. See infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
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to state sovereignty.' 7 The challenges failed, but they were an important part
of the postwar transition to federal supremacy: Indeed, Wisconsin may fairly
be said to have sealed that supremacy.18 The Kentucky Supreme Court
bitterly protested federal wartime laws affecting the slave system, the civil
liberties of white Kentuckians, and the postwar civil rights laws that expanded
the influence of federal courts, but for the most part, the Kentucky court
continued its prewar tradition of moderation as to federalism. 19 During its
short life, Georgia's Reconstruction-era Supreme Court urged acceptance of
federal supremacy as a permanent legal principle; successor courts agreed,
and judicial deference to federalism was one of the Reconstruction court's
few permanent legacies. 20 After the end of Reconstruction, resistance to
federalism died out in all three states, except for a minor controversy over
anti-removal provisions in state corporation laws that was resolved in favor of
federalism in 1921.21
II. STATE SUPREME COURTS AND FEDERALISM DURING THE ANTEBELLUM

ERA
The American debate over federalism began during the colonial era as a
prolonged dispute between advocates of centralized British control over North
America and supporters of governmental and economic autonomy for each
colony. 2 The dispute continued after independence: It reached a peak in the
debates of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, in the FederalistPapers, and
in the state ratifying conventions after the Constitution was drafted. It fell to
Alexander Hamilton to expound the federalists' view of the proper judicial
relationship between state governments and the new federal government.
Echoing the view of many federalists that the national government was a
creation of the American people directly, not of the states, 24 Hamilton stated
that the federal judiciary should have the final and perhaps the only word as to
the meaning of the new Constitution:
The national and State systems are to be regarded as one whole. The
courts of the latter will of course be natural auxiliaries to the execution
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra notes 128-81 and accompanying text.
infra notes 157-71 and accompanying text.
infra notes 188-229 and accompanying text.
infra notes 237-251 and accompanying text.
infra notes 252-265 and accompanying text.
BENNETT, supra note 3, at 15-51; MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 11-12.

23. See generally THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1976-2003).
24. BENNETT, supra note 3, at 65-67, 84-85.
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of the laws of the Union, and an appeal from them will as naturally lie
to that tribunal which is destined to unite and assimilate the principles
of national justice and the rules of national decisions.25
In the state ratifying conventions, many anti-federalists contended that
state courts should have a concurrent right with the federal courts to decide
the constitutionality of state laws, but unlike Hamilton, few of them addressed
the issue of who would prevail in case of conflicting interpretations.2 6 The
first Congress confirmed in section 12 of the 1789 Judiciary Act that federal
courts had jurisdiction over all cases involving constitutional issues, including
jurisdiction over state cases by right of removal, but Congress did not address
the issue of who had the final say on such issues.27
A. Kentucky: A Loyalty Sorely Tested (Part1)

Between 1789 and 1861, many states participated in a running dispute
with the federal government over the boundaries of federal and state power.
Wisconsin, Kentucky, and Georgia all played prominent roles in the dispute.
In 1798, the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures, reacting to the highly
unpopular Federal Alien and Sedition Acts, 28thproduced the first important
statements of the interposition doctrine-that is, the concept that a state's right
to determine the validity of federal laws independently of the federal judiciary
is an essential component of liberty. Virginia contented itself with a general
statement that the states have a right "to interpose for arresting the progress of
the evil" of abusive federal laws, 29 but Kentucky went further and made clear
that it believed interposition powers extended to the state courts. The
Kentucky legislature stated:
Resolved,... That the government created by [the Constitution] was
not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers
delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not
the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other
cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party
has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions, as of the

25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
26. BENNETT, supra note 3, at 78-87.
27. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 79 (1789).
28. Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798). The Act provided that citizens of a nation
that conducted or threatened "any invasion or predatory incursion" of the United States were liable to
arrest and removal upon order of the President. Id.
29. THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800: TOUCHING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS 22

(Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1850).
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mode and measure of redress.3 °
Kentucky's discontent with the federal government surfaced again in two
controversies of the 1820s. The first controversy arose out of a 1792 compact
by which Virginia ceded its claims to Kentucky's territory, thus allowing
Kentucky to become a state, and the new state agreed to recognize pre-1792
Virginia land grants within its borders.3 ' In response to the numerous disputes
that subsequently arose over land grant boundaries, the Kentucky legislature
enacted laws providing that in order to have their titles confirmed, Virginia
claimants must pay Kentucky holders of disputed lands the value of
improvements the holders had made on the land.32 Virginia claimants charged
that such laws impaired their contract rights under the 1792 compact, and in
Green v. Biddle, the Supreme Court upheld their position, much to the
Kentuckians' displeasure.33
Second, by the early 1820s, many Kentuckians were heavily indebted to
the Bank of the United States and other out-of-state creditors. In order to
relieve their plight, the legislature enacted relief laws, including laws
providing that land foreclosure sales must fetch close to the full value of the
land to be valid and laws forcing debtors to accept Kentucky state bank notes
in payment of debts.34 The Kentucky District Court refused to enforce such
laws, reasoning that they unconstitutionally impaired creditors' contract
rights; the laws were a subject of bitter controversy in the Kentucky state
courts, with most courts enforcing them. 35 The conflict created an anomalous
situation: Out-of-state creditors could take advantage of diversity jurisdiction
to obtain full relief in federal courts, but Kentucky creditors, who were limited

30. Id. at 162. Forrest McDonald has pointed out that many states had sedition laws similar to
the federal law that Kentucky and Virginia attacked; Kentucky's primary concern was the threat that
nationalization of sedition laws posed to state sovereignty. MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 41.
31. Act ofFeb. 4, 1791, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 189 (1791); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7, 9 (Michie 2002);
MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 79.
32. MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 79-80.
33. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
34. MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 79-80; STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS: THE
STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 105-13 (Herman V. Ames ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1900-06)
[hereinafter STATE DOCUMENTS].
35. The Kentucky Supreme Court struck down most of the debtor relief laws, agreeing that they
unconstitutionally impaired creditors' contract rights. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 83-84.
In 1824 the legislature responded by abolishing the court and creating a new supreme court. 1824
Ky. Acts 53. The old court refused to retire, and for several years, the clash between the two
dominated Kentucky politics. When economic conditions improved and pressure for debtor relief
abated in the late 1820s, the legislature abolished the new court. See MCDONALD, supra note 3, at

83-84.
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to state courts, could not. 36 This inequity, together with the deep resentment
over the Green decision, impelled Kentucky lawmakers to consider reviving
the interposition doctrine of 1798. 37 In a message to the 1825 legislature,
Governor Joseph Desha complained:
What chance for justice have the States when the usurpers of their
rights are made their judges? Just as much as individuals when judged
by their oppressors. It is therefore believed to be the right, as it may
hereafter become the duty of the State governments, to protect
themselves from encroachments, and their citizens from oppression,
by refusing obedience to the unconstitutional mandates of the federal
judges.38
The Kentucky Supreme Court took a more restrained tone. In Bodley v.
Gaither,39 it concluded that it was not bound by Green, but it expressed its
opinion with caution rather than defiance. The court relied on the fact that
there was no majority opinion in Green, but it stated that as a general rule it
would defer to the United States Supreme Court in areas where the
Constitution clearly gave that Court the final say:
That we should consider ourselves bound by the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States settling a construction of the
constitution, or laws of the United States, in cases where the Supreme
court [sic] possesses revising jurisdiction over the decisions of this
court, we shall not pretend to controvert.40
The Kentucky court continued to decline opportunities to promote a
states' rights position in the remaining years before the war. In Dickey v.
Maysville, Washington, Paris & Lexington Turnpike Road Co., the court held
that the federal government had the right to use a state-built post road between
Maysville and Lexington on the same terms as other users, 4 1 notwithstanding
the fact that the government's refusal to finance the road eight years earlier
had created a new surge of hostility toward the federal government within
Kentucky.42 The Dickey case is not so notable for its result as for its rejection
36. MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 83-84.
37. STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 34, at 111-13.
38. Joseph Desha Message to Kentucky Legislature, November 7, 1825, reprinted in STATE
DOCUMENTS, supra note 34, at 113.
39. 19 Ky. (3 T.B. Mon.) 57 (1825).
40. Id. at 58.
41. 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 113, 137-38 (1838).
42. See REM1NI, supra note 5, at 210-12.
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of a challenge to Congress's authority to build federal post roads: The
Kentucky court held that the Constitution must be read broadly to give
Congress such power, even though Congress had chosen not to exercise it
here.43 In the 1850s, the Kentucky court also drew a careful line between
federal and state power in several cases addressing the right of each
government to regulate traffic on the Ohio River. The court took pains to
acknowledge the authority of the United States Supreme Court in this area and
to defer to federal authority when Congress had enacted laws clearly preempting state regulation, 4 but it also emphasized that federal legislation on
aspects of river navigation that only "remotely" affected interstate commerce
would be "inconsistent with the essential rights of self-government and selfpreservation which never were, and, so long as
they retain a vestige of
' 45
states.
the
by
yielded
be
can,
never
independence,
B. Wisconsin: Changing the Contours of the States' Rights Debate
Wisconsin became a state in 1848, at the beginning of the final phase of
the struggle over slavery, which culminated in the Civil War. Wisconsin's
major contribution to the anti-slavery movement was in the legal arena: It
fundamentally changed the shape of anti-slavery jurisprudence by welding the
states' rights doctrine to the more limited arguments that previously had been
made against laws protecting slavery.46
From its inception in the 1830s, the legal wing of the anti-slavery
movement, led by Salmon Chase of Ohio and James Bimey of New York,47
had focused primarily on the dichotomy between "natural" laws (that is,
principles of justice embedded in the human spirit that did not need to be
codified because they were universal) and "positive" laws that did not reflect
universal human sentiments and therefore could be created only by legislative
act.48 Anti-slavery jurists argued that because slavery was repugnant to
human nature, it could be enforced only through positive laws and that49such
laws, particularly the Fugitive Clause of the United States Constitution and
43. 37 Ky. (7 Dana) at 130-37.
44. See, e.g., Dryden v. Commonwealth, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 476, 479-80 (1855) (holding that
federal licensing scheme for river pilots pre-empted state licensing laws); City of Newport v.
Taylor's Ex'rs, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 557, 630-31 (1855).
45. City of Newport, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) at 631.
46. See infra notes 47-83 and accompanying text.
47. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 161-

62, 172-73 (1975). Chase served as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1864 to
1873. See generally JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A BIOGRAPHY (1995).

48. COVER, supra note 47, at 150-54, 161-65. See also id. at 8-82 for a detailed discussion of
the intellectual history of the arguments developed by the Chase-Bimey group.
49. Article IV,Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution states:
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the Federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,50 should be interpreted as narrowly as
possible. 5' Because the Fugitive Clause and the 1793 Act did not contain
enforcement mechanisms, none should be implied, and Northern efforts to aid
escaped slaves should not be subject to civil or criminal penalties. 2 In
addition, the Chase-Birney group argued that if enforcement laws did not
provide such basic rights as the right to a jury trial (which as a practical matter
would have ensured that no aider of fugitive slaves would ever be convicted
in the North), then the laws should be held invalid." The group's arguments
met with little success: A series of challenges to the 1793 fugitive slave law
met with failure in the United States Supreme Court and in the supreme courts
of several northern states.54
In 1850, as the slavery crisis deepened, Congress passed a new fugitive
slave law that was deeply unpopular throughout the North,5 5 and in 1854, an
opportunity to challenge the new law arose when Joshua Glover, a fugitive
slave who had escaped from Missouri to Wisconsin, was captured in Racine
and held by federal officials for return to his owner. A mob led by Sherman
Booth, a leading Milwaukee abolitionist, broke into the jail and freed Glover,
who then escaped to Canada.5 6 Federal officials charged Booth with aiding
and abetting, a violation of the 1850 Act. Booth's attorney, Byron Paine,
applied to Justice Abram Smith of the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a writ of
habeas corpus releasing Booth from federal custody on the ground that the
1850 Act was unconstitutional. 57 Paine asserted the traditional Chase-Birney
arguments against the Act, but added a new one: interposition. 8 Relying on

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due.
I.

50. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
51. COVER, supra note 47, at 157-68.

52. Id. at 157-85.
53. 1d
54. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) and Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5

How.) 215 (1847), the high Court upheld the validity of the 1793 Act and affirmed Congress's power
to implement the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution by enacting enforcement provisions. See
also In re Sims, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285 (1851); Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 198 (1859);
Commonwealth ex rel. Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle 62 (Pa. 1819).
55. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
56. Alfons J. Beitzinger, FederalLaw Enforcement and the Booth Cases, 41 MARQ. L. REV. 7,
10-13 (1957); Joseph A. Ranney, "Suffering the Agonies of Their Righteousness ": The Rise and Fall
of the States Rights Movement in Wisconsin, 1854-1861, 75 WIs. MAG. HiST. 83, 87-88 (1991).

57. Beitzinger, supra note 56, at 10-13.
58. 3 FUGITIVE SLAVERY AND AMERICAN COURTS 347 (Paul Finkleman ed., Series No. 2,
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the portion of the 1798 Kentucky Resolutions previously quoted59 and on the

Virginia Supreme Court's refusal to obey a mandate of the United States
60

Supreme Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, Paine argued that Wisconsin
had the right to decide the Act's constitutionality independently of the federal
courts, which could not override its decision. 61 He warned further that "it is

only by maintaining
the rights of the States, that the Union can be
62
preserved.,

To the great surprise of most observers, Justice Smith adopted Paine's
arguments in full and ordered Booth's release.63 The full supreme court
sustained Smith's position by a 2-1 vote. 64 Interestingly, Smith emphasized
interposition more heavily than traditional anti-slavery arguments, perhaps out
of concern that because other courts had rejected the traditional arguments,
reliance on them would weaken the force of his opinion. Smith recited
several lines of argument often made by interpositionists: For example, he
relied heavily on the fact that the United States Constitution conferred
enumerated rather than general powers on the United States government and
65
on the Tenth Amendment's general reservation of other powers to the states.
Smith also cited the Virginia Supreme Court's opinion in the Martin

1988) (reprinting Paine's argument).
59. 3 id.at 348; see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
60. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see also 3 FUGITIVE SLAVERY AND AMERICAN COURTS,
supra note 58, at 348. In the Martin case, during the Revolution, Virginia confiscated a large tract of
land owned by Lord Fairfax; after the war it sold the land. Fairfax's heirs subsequently demanded
return of the land under the Jay Treaty of 1794. The Virginia Court of Appeals rejected their claim,
Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1814), but in 1816 the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Virginia court's decision. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 360-62. Judge Spencer Roane, the
author of the Virginia court's decision, denounced the Supreme Court's decision and denied that it
had the right to reverse a state's interpretation of a treaty or any other law. Virginia actively resisted
enforcement of the Supreme Court's decision for a number of years. See TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER,
THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: STATE JUDGES AND SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS 17901890, at 31-38 (Paul Finkleman & Kermit L. Hall eds., 1999); MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 76-78.
61. 3 FUGITIVE SLAVERY AND AMERICAN COURTS, supra note 58, at 349.
62. Id.at 368.
63. In re Booth, 3 Wis. I (1854) ("Booth "). The procedural history of the Booth decision is
complex. In his original opinion ("Booth I"), Smith issued a writ of habeas corpus voiding a federal
magistrate's order to hold Booth pending the filing of charges against him. Id. at I. The full court
affirmed by a 2-1 vote. 3 Wis. at 49 ("Booth 11"). Federal authorities then indicted Booth and again
jailed him; Booth sought a second writ from the full Wisconsin Supreme Court, which was denied
because Booth was now being held as part of pending federal proceedings and comity required the
Wisconsin court not to interfere in such proceedings. Ex parte Booth, 3 Wis. 145 (1854) ("Booth
I/1'). After Booth was convicted, he again applied for a writ; the full court granted the writ, again by
a 2-1 vote, on the ground that the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional, and thus, the
proceedings under it were invalid. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 157 (1854) ("Booth IV').
64. Booth 11, 3 Wis. at 49; Booth IV, 3 Wis. at 157.
65. Booth 1, 3 Wis.at 24-25; Booth IV, 3 Wis.at 193.
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controversy 66 and Thomas Jefferson's expressions of concern that giving the
Supreme Court (and thus the federal government) final say as to the meaning
of the Constitution might lead to a fatal unbalancing of federal and state
spheres of power, and eventually, to federal tyranny and the demise of
democracy.67 Smith was deeply concerned about these issues. He argued that
state court judges must interpret the Constitution and hold to their
interpretation regardless of federal pressure, and that such independence was
vital to the preservation of American liberty:
Unless that [federal] court proceeds within the limits which the
constitution and the laws of congress have prescribed, its acts are a
nullity. Its jurisdiction is always open to question, and must
affirmatively appear.... Were it otherwise, that court might...
administer the whole common law code of offenses and punishments,
from whose judgments there could be no appeal, and whose prison
doors no earthly power could unlock. Such doctrine is monstrous.
We have not yet reached the point of submission.68
Smith was stung by the criticism of his opponents that independent state
interpretation of the Constitution would lead to judicial inconsistency and,
ultimately, to anarchy.6 9 In a supplemental opinion, Smith responded that
66. Booth II, 3 Wis. at 88-89; see supra note 60. In particular, Smith cited a comment of
United States Supreme Court Justice William Johnson in his concurring opinion in Martin that:
[s]o firmly am I persuaded that the American people can no longer enjoy the blessings of a
free government, whenever the state sovereignties shall be prostrated at the feet of the
federal government ... that I could borrow the language of a celebrated orator, and
exclaim, "I rejoice that Virginia has resisted!"
Booth 11, 3 Wis. at 88-89 (quoting Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 363 (1816))
(Johnson, J., concurring). However, Johnson was more critical of the Virginia court than his
colleagues, and he agreed that in case of conflict between the United States Supreme Court and state
courts, the Supreme Court must prevail. See Martin, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) at 363-64.
67. Booth 11, 3 Wis. at 94.
68. Booth IV, 3 Wis. at 217.
69. The most eloquent criticism was that of Edward Ryan, a prominent Milwaukee lawyer who
was hired to assist federal authorities in their appeal of Smith's initial decision. Ryan filed a brief
with the full court in which he pointed out that:
If the supreme law of the land, the constitution of the United States as interpreted by its
constitutional exponent [the Supreme Court], is to give way to elementary criticisms and
decisions of the State authorities, it is not difficult to foresee most grave and disastrous
results.... And the system which, with all the inherited evils and all its own sins, is still
the political hope of all mankind, may be led step by step into dissension, disruption and
civil warfare, to gratify the consciences of those who trusting nothing to concession,
nothing to time, nothing to Providence, would destroy everything imperfect, in a world in
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there would be no danger if the federal and state courts respected the
boundaries of each other's power, and he pointed out that the controversy
over the Alien and Sedition Acts died out quickly after the Kentucky and
Virginia Resolutions were passed.70
The Wisconsin court's Booth decision quickly attracted national attention
and made Paine a hero of the anti-slavery movement. 71 The federal
government appealed to the Supreme Court, and in 1859, after a long delay
caused by the Wisconsin court's refusal to certify the appeal record, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Roger Taney, overturned the
Wisconsin court's decision. 72 Chief Justice Taney spent relatively little time
reviewing the original constitutional debates over federalism and subsequent
legal clashes such as the Martin controversy. Instead, he invoked the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 73 and characterized
section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act 74 as "tell[ing] us, in language not to be
mistaken, the great importance which the patriots and statesmen of the First
Congress attached to this appellate power, and the foresight and care with
which they guarded its free and independent exercise against interference or
obstruction by States or State tribunals., 75 Chief Justice Taney bluntly
criticized the Wisconsin court's states' rights theory as "new in the
jurisprudence of the United States, as well as of the States" 76 and pointed out
which nothing is perfect.
MADISON DAILY ARGUS & DEMOCRAT, June 30, 1854, at 2.
70. Booth IV, 3 Wis. at 202-03. The other members of the Wisconsin court left the leading role
to Smith. Chief Justice Edward Whiton, who supported Smith, issued two short opinions adding
little to Smith's arguments. Justice Samuel Crawford concluded that Booth should be released
because of procedural errors by the federal authorities, but he argued that the United States Supreme
Court had the final say as to the meaning of the Constitution in cases of conflict with state
authorities. Other than a brief reference to a constitutional treatise written by Justice Joseph Story of
the United States Supreme Court, he cited no authority in support of his position. Booth II, 3 Wis. at
75-76 (Crawford, J., dissenting). Crawford was defeated for reelection in 1855 by Orsamus Cole,
who supported Smith's position; the election turned almost exclusively on the states' rights issue.
See Ranney, supra note 56, at 94-97.
71. See letter from Charles Sumner to Paine (August 8, 1854) and letter from Wendell Phillips
to Paine (November 24, 1854), Byron Paine Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society.
72. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 514 (1858).
73. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides that: "This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. V1, cl. 2.
74. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 85 (1789). Section 25 provides that any judgment of a
state supreme court holding a federal law unconstitutional, rejecting a constitutional challenge to a
state law, or rejecting a claim of right under the United States Constitution may be appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
75. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 522.
76. Id. at 514.
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that:
no one will suppose that a Government which has now lasted nearly
seventy years, enforcing its laws by its own tribunals, and preserving
the union of the States, could have lasted a single year, or fulfilled the
high trusts committed to it, if offences against its laws could not have
been punished without the consent of the State in which the culprit
was found.77
When Chief Justice Taney's decision was transmitted to Wisconsin, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court took the extraordinary step of declining to accept
and file it. 78 Justices Cole and Paine supported interposition and did not file
an opinion, but newly appointed Chief Justice Luther S. Dixon defended the
federalist position in a lengthy dissenting opinion. 79 In 1854, Justice Smith
forged a link between states' rights and the battle against slavery, portraying
the initial Booth opinion in part as a stand against a federal court system
controlled by slaveholding interests; 80 Chief Justice Dixon tried to sever that
connection by citing leading jurists from both sections of the nation,
Chancellor James Kent of New York and John C. Calhoun of South Carolina,
in support of the rule of federal supremacy as to matters within the scope of
federal jurisdiction.8 1 Chief Justice Dixon, like Justice Smith, cited Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, but Dixon naturally relied on the Supreme Court's
affirmation of federal judicial supremacy over constitutional matters and not
on the Virginia court's opinion to the contrary.82 Like Smith and Taney,
Dixon devoted a part of his opinion to the practical implications of states'
rights: He agreed with Taney that his colleagues' reasoning would "place it in
the power of any one state, beyond all peaceful remedy, to arrest the
execution of the laws of the entire Union, and to break down and destroy at
pleasure every barrier created and right given by the constitution."83
77. Id.at515.
78. Ableman v. Booth, 11 Wis. 498 (1859). Byron Paine, who had just been elected to the
supreme court on the strength of his role in the Booth case, recused himself. Id.at 499. Justice Cole
voted not to file the decision; Chief Justice Luther S. Dixon voted to file it. Id Because an
affirmative vote to file the Supreme Court's decision was necessary, the opinion was not filed.
79. Id.at 499.
80. See In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1,48-49, 118-20 (1854).
81. Ableman, 1IWis. at 505-06 (citing Calhoun), 515-16 (citing Kent).
82. Id. at 507-09.
83. Id. at 513. Dixon was nominally a Republican; when he ran for re-election in 1860, his
party refused him renomination, but he won a very close race with help from Democrats and
dissident Republicans. Dixon's victory, together with the fact that by 1860 it was clear the
Republican party was about to take power nationally, caused states' rights sentiment to ebb
somewhat in Wisconsin after that time. Ranney, supra note 56, at 108-11.
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C. Georgia:The Defensive Side of States Rights
Georgia did not create a state supreme court until 1845, but prior to that
time it played an important role in the national debate over federalism.

84

In

Chisholm v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court held that creditors of a
British loyalist whose estate Georgia had confiscated during the Revolution
could sue the state directly notwithstanding its claim of sovereign immunity.
The Georgia Assembly passed a resolution refusing to recognize the decision
and threatening any official who tried to enforce it with hanging.86 Other
states also protested, and as a result, the Eleventh
Amendment was enacted,
87
court.
federal
in
suit
from
states
immunizing
In the early 1830s, tension again flared between Georgia and the Supreme
Court over the state's effort to remove the Cherokee tribe and open tribal
lands in Georgia to white settlement.8 8 The Georgia legislature enacted laws
asserting state jurisdiction over such lands and nullifying federal treaties that
recognized Cherokee land rights.8 9 At about the same time, state officials
prosecuted a tribal member, Corn Tassel, for murdering a fellow Indian on
tribal lands, notwithstanding a consensus among legal authorities that the
federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over such crimes. 90 In late 1830, the
Supreme Court stayed Corn Tassel's execution until it could decide a
challenge to the state's right to prosecute him, 9' but Governor George Gilmer
and the legislature openly refused to obey the writ, and Corn Tassel was
hanged. 92 Gilmer explained that "the right to punish crimes, against the peace
and good order of this state, in accordance with existing laws is an original
and a necessary part of sovereignty which the State of Georgia has never
parted with. 9 3 The Cherokees subsequently challenged the Georgia laws,
asserting state jurisdiction over tribal lands, and in Worcester v. Georgia, the

84. Prior to 1845, the state's circuit court judges met once a year to review and discuss each
other's decisions, but they had no corrective power over each other. PAUL D. HICKS, JOSEPH HENRY
LUMPKN: GEORGIA'S FIRST CHIEF JUSTICE 86-87 (2002).

85. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1792).
86. MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 35-36; STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 34, at 9-11.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
88. TIM A. GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 103-14 (2002); MCDONALD, supra note 3, at

98-103.
89. 1829 Ga. Laws 98-101.
90. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (1817); Act of
March 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329 (1793); Act ofJuly 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 138 (1790).
91. GARRISON, supra note 88, at 103-24.
92. Id.at 121-24.
93. STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 34, at 127.
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Court upheld their position.94 But Georgia officials again refused to obey the
Court's decision, and during the next few years, virtually all Cherokees in
Georgia were forced to leave the state.95
The Indian removal controversy had passed by the time the Georgia
Supreme Court was created, and with one notable exception, the court took a
moderate tone on states' rights between 1845 and 1860. Chief Justice Joseph
H. Lumpkin was primarily responsible for that tone. Two years spent away
from Georgia at Princeton University and a lifelong sympathy for the Whig
party and its commercial orientation gave Lumpkin a nationalist perspective
that was lacking in many Georgians, and during his legal and judicial career,
he reinforced this perspective by maintaining active contacts with colleagues
in other states.9 6 In 1848, the Georgia court explicitly affirmed that the United
States Constitution, federal treaties, and federal laws "made in pursuance of
the Constitution" took precedence over Georgia laws,97 and in two cases,
Lumpkin indicated that, like the early federalists, he viewed the federal
government as a creation and instrument of the American people rather than
of the states. 98
The one exception to the court's moderate tone was an opinion written by
Justice Henry Benning, an ardent states' rights advocate elected to the court in
94. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Worcester involved a challenge to one of the 1829 laws that
prohibited whites from residing on tribal lands unless they took an oath to obey Georgia's laws. Id.
at 530. The tribe had previously mounted a broader challenge to the 1829 laws, but the high Court
had reluctantly dismissed the challenge because it did not have jurisdiction: The Cherokee tribe,
although a separate political entity, was not a "foreignstate" within the meaning of Article III of the
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 18-20 (1831).
95. GARRISON, supra note 88, at 229-32; GRACE S. WOODWARD, THE CHEROKEES 174-218
(1963).
96. See HICKS, supra note 84, at 8-28, 107-110; see also HUEBNER, supra note 60, at 81-86
(discussing Lumpkin's legal philosophy).
97. Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 204-05 (1848).
98. Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 366 (1852); Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210, 216 (1850). In Beall,
Lumpkin stated that both the federal and state constitutions "are the acts of the people, and not of the
Government. In these, theirsovereign will is embodied." Beall, 8 Ga. at 216. In Campbell, he noted
that the federal Bill of Rights "was primarily introduced for the purpose of preventing an abuse of
power by the Federal Government," but he went on to state that:
[g]rasping, however, as the National Judiciary is supposed to be, and studious to
accumulate power in the central government, it may well be questioned, whether the
limitations and restrictions imposed by these amendments, were necessary... [because]
[t]he rights which they were designed to protect, were too sacred to be violated by any
republican tribunal.
Campbell, I I Ga. at 365. He then repeated his theme from Beall that "we have but one people...
which, divided into separate communities, constitute the respective State governments [and]
comprise in the aggregate, the United States Government." Id. at 366.
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1853. 99 In Padelford, Fay & Co. v. Mayor of Savannah,100 a Savannah
merchant, relying on the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Brown v. Maryland,0 1 challenged the city's sales tax on the ground that to the
extent the tax covered imported goods passing through Savannah, it violated
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 102 Speaking on
behalf of the Georgia court, Benning rejected the challenge, holding that
Brown applied only to direct taxes on goods, whereas the Savannah tax was
based on merchants' overall profits. 0 3 But Benning was not content to stop
there: He criticized Brown as an example of unwarranted federal meddling in
state commerce and used the occasion to publish a lengthy
personal discourse
04
on the respective spheres of the federal and state courts. 1
Benning began with an exhaustive dissection of the constitutional
ratification debates in order to show that the states had not intended to give
Congress any powers other than those specifically enumerated in the
Constitution. 0 5
He reviewed the Chisholm and Cherokee removal
controversies and interpreted Georgia's reaction to the Worcester decision as
not only merely political resistance but also a pronouncement that Congress
had no power to enact section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act. 1 6 Benning
articulated the interposition doctrine in terms strikingly similar to those used
by Abram Smith in the Booth case:
The Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction over this
Court, or over any department of the Government of Georgia. This
Court is not a United States Court; and therefore, neither the
Government of the United States, nor any department of it, can give
this Court an order.

99. Benning served one term on the court from 1853 to 1859. He had served as a Georgia
delegate to the 1850 Nashville Convention, at which the Southern states considered future action to
be taken in light of Northern resistance to the expansion of slavery, and had spoken favorably of
secession at the convention. Benning was one of the leaders of Georgia's secession movement in
1861, and he served as a general in the Confederate army. A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
GEORGIA 50 (John B. Harris ed., 1948).
100. 14 Ga. 438 (1854).
101. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). In Brown, the Supreme Court struck down a Maryland
law that imposed a license fee on persons importing goods by the bale or package. Id. at 436.
102. Padelford, 14 Ga. at 440-41. The Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, states
in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States."
103. Padelford, 14 Ga. at 444-45.
104. Id. at 445-520.
105. Id. at 454-76.
106. Id.at 478-84.
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The idea meant to be conveyed [in the ratification debates] is clearly
this: that the General Government has a sphere in which it is supreme,
and the State Governments a sphere in which they are supreme, that
these spheres intersect each other, and that the space included between
the arcs of intersection, is common to both-is a space in which both
are equally supreme, and in which there is no rule but one - Qui prior
est in10 tempore
potior est in jure [he who is first in time prevails in
7
law].

Benning concluded by warning that broad construction of Article III of the
United States Constitution to give federal courts power to overrule state court
decisions "would
be to make the States exist, at the mercy of the General
1 08
Governments."

The parallels between Booth and Padelfordand the irony that two states at
opposite ends of the debate over slavery were both espousing states' rights did
not go unnoticed. Six years later, as the prospect of civil war was moving
from conjecture to reality, James Doolittle of Wisconsin and Robert Toombs
of Georgia defended their respective supreme courts during a prolonged
debate in the United States Senate over Northern resistance to ftgitive slave
laws. Senator Toombs began by denouncing Wisconsin as "one of the
youngest of our sisters, who got rotten before she got ripe," who as a result of
the Booth decision "comes to us... with her hands all smeared with the blood
of a violated Constitution, all polluted with perjury."' 10 9 Senator Doolittle
responded by pointing out instances of Southern defiance of the federal
government, with particular emphasis on Georgia's course in the Chisholm
and Cherokee removal controversies, the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions,
and Virginia's action in the Martin controversy."l 0 Doolittle also cited
Benning's Padelford opinion as an example of Southern intransigence: He
argued that, unlike Benning, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had not absolutely
denied priority of federal decisions over those of state courts but "ha[d] only
asserted [its] right to judge for [itself] as to what cases are not under the
Constitution of the United States.""' Doolittle warned that the dispute over
federal jurisdiction was a more important and enduring issue than many
people realized:
It is a question altogether of more consequence than the slavery
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 499-501.
Id. at 504.
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1860).
Id. at 121.

111.

Id.
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question itself.., whether any jurisdiction or authority can be
conferred upon a district court of the United States by an
unconstitutional law.... All the world knows that the district courts of
the United States are courts of special and limitedjurisdiction. They
have just such power as the law gives them, and no more. Their
whole jurisdiction is statutory, and depends upon the acts of Congress;
and they, in their turn, depending upon, and subject to, the
Constitution. When you speak of an act of Congress, which is itself
unconstitutional, having any validity to confer any jurisdiction, it is
preposterous, a solecism, an12absurdity. Sir, an unconstitutional law is
no law; it is a mere nullity.
Doolittle then echoed the theme previously stated by both Smith and
Benning that allowing the Supreme Court to have the final say as to the
constitutionality of state and federal laws would lead to despotism:
Civil war is, indeed, a terrible calamity ...But, sir, terrible as it is

upon one hand, still greater dangers would arise from conferring on
the Federal Supreme Court the absolute power of construing the
Constitution of the United States... In the language of Mr. Jefferson,
the constitution on this hypothesis would become "a mere thing of
wax in the hands of the' 1 judiciary,
which they may twist and shape into
3
any form they please."
Toombs responded with a vigorous defense of his home state. He
disposed of Doolittle's allusion to Chisholm by noting that the enactment of
the Eleventh Amendment had vindicated Georgia's position, and he disposed
of Worcester by means of a more technical argument, namely that the
plaintiffs in that case had never sought to enforce the Supreme Court's
mandate in the Georgia courts.1 14 Toombs argued that the Virginia court's
course in the Martin controversy was distinguishable from Wisconsin's
decision in Booth because in Martin, unlike Booth, the state court acquired
jurisdiction before the federal courts did. 115 Toombs suggested Benning's
position was distinguishable on the same basis:
I say, then, that no decision was made on the twenty-fifth section of
the judiciary act by the supreme court of the State of Georgia; that it
has never been decided to be unconstitutional there;... Judge
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

122.
125 (citation omitted).
890; see supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
891.
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Benning is a very able man; but in that case [Padelford] he does not
support Wisconsin; on the contrary, he condemns her; for he holds the
Supreme Court of the United States and of the State to be concurrent
jurisdictions, and that whichever gets the case first shall finally
determine it; that one cannot overrule the other. But Wisconsin holds
that even when the courts of116the United States have got the case and
decided it, they may seize it.
Like many advocates, both Toombs and Doolittle read their supporting
authorities narrowly and downplayed or ignored important countervailing
authorities in order to achieve a strategic goal. Contrary to Toombs'
suggestion, Benning did not concede in Padelford that state courts must
submit to federal constitutional decisions on all issues that by chance had first
come before the federal courts: Rather, he indicated that state judges could
make independent constitutional decisions in all cases before them, even if
17
federal courts had previously addressed and decided the point at issue.'
Toombs' careful effort to avoid criticism of Georgia's interposition in the
Cherokee removal controversy also is telling. Doolittle paid less attention to
fine legal distinctions than Toombs: Like Justice Smith, he squarely affirmed
the right of state courts to decide constitutional issues independently of
federal authority and denied that federal courts had the final say as to
constitutional principles under any circumstances. At bottom, the differences
between Toombs and Doolittle were political, not legal. Doolittle was
speaking at a time when most anti-slavery advocates felt that the federal
government was controlled by slave interests, and therefore, they had little to
gain by defending federalism; for exactly the same reason, Toombs
undoubtedly felt that the times demanded that Southerners defend federal
courts. 118 But a close reading of their arguments shows that both men were
squarely in the mainstream of nineteenth century states' rights advocates. 19
116. Id. at 893.
117. Padelford, Fay & Co. v. Mayor of Savannah, 14 Ga. 438, 499 (1854).
118. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS 417-43, 573-76 (1978).
119. Justice Charles Jenkins of the Georgia Supreme Court issued a final states' rights
manifesto for Georgia in Mims v. Wimberly, 33 Ga. 587 (1863). The manifesto is unusual because it
dealt with the relationship between Georgia and the Confederate central government. Jenkins again
criticized the original federalist view that "the character of the Government, is that the people of the
United States, as an aggregate, sovereign community, or body politic, ordained and established the
Constitution." Id. at 589. Like Benning, Jenkins relied heavily on the ratification debates as
evidence that this view "is against the truth of history." Id. Jenkins noted that the Confederate
Constitution corrected this "error" by referring to "we the states" rather than "we the people" in its
preamble; he held that "[t]here are as many sovereignties as there are States in the Confederacy, and
no more." Id. at 591-92. Nevertheless, he held that as to military matters, the central government's
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III. CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1860-1877)
The Civil War and Reconstruction transformed the relationship between
the federal and state governments in both obvious and non-obvious ways.
During Abraham Lincoln's administration, the federal government grew
exponentially in order to administer the war effort. 120 It also revolutionized
the American system of currency, taxation, and finance; stretched its wartime
powers to the limits of the Constitution and beyond; and deposed the wartime
governments of the Confederate states. 121 The eclipse of Southern state
governments was so complete that a significant number of lawmakers and
jurists adopted the "state suicide" theory after the war, holding that the states
had literally ceased to exist and had resumed territorial status. 122 The
delegitimation of the ex-Confederate states was an important
factor in the
23
war.1
the
after
sentiment
rights
states'
of
general decline
But these developments did not end the debate over federalism. Even
when federal supremacy was at its height, there was always a vocal minority
that challenged its expansion and urged a return to "[t]he Constitution As It Is,
The Union As It Was."' 12 4 Such sentiment was particularly strong in the
border states. Kentuckians bitterly opposed many congressional wartime
measures and postwar civil rights acts that affected the rights of freed
slaves,' 25 and as a result the Kentucky Supreme Court had to strike a delicate
balance between anti-federalist sentiments and the court's tradition of
deference to federal authority.
By contrast, Reconstruction effectively
silenced any overt opposition Georgia might have mounted to the new federal
supremacy: Unionist judges occupied the Georgia bench after the war and
generally deferred to laws expanding the federal government's power, partly
out of necessity and partly out of conviction. 126 The post-Reconstruction
Georgia Supreme Court declined to reverse this trend; thus, judicial deference
to federalism was one of the few permanent legacies Reconstruction left in

authority must take precedence; accordingly, the court quashed a writ of habeas that a lower state
court had issued to release state officials held by central Confederate authorities under the
Confederate draft laws. Id. at 593, 597-98.
120. See 6 MCPHERSON, supranote 6, at 323-25.
121. Id.at 287-90, 436, 442-48, 492-94; BENNETT, supra note 3, at 187.
122. MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 209-11. In Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 702-09
(1868), the United States Supreme Court held that although the southern states' participation in the
Confederacy had operated to suspend their rights as states, they had never left the Union because the
union of states was indissoluble. See id at 702-09.
123. BENNETT, supra note 3, at 187-90; see also infra note 146 and accompanying text.
124. See 6 MCPHERSON, supra note 6, at 493-94.

125. See COULTER, supra note 13, at 156-60, 197-205, 259-61, 264-70.
126. See infra notes 230-51 and accompanying text.
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Georgia.
Wisconsin's postwar course was the most surprising. Even though the
Booth controversy faded and the Union won the war, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court continued to defend its states' rights position, particularly in its
opposition to several wartime removal acts designed to expand federal
jurisdiction. Ironically, Wisconsin's opposition to the removal acts led to a
series of United States Supreme Court decisions that upheld the acts and
eliminated all doubt as to whether the Supreme Court could review and
overrule state court constitutional decisions.
A. Wisconsin as Keeper of the States' Rights Flame
Byron Paine, Booth's lawyer, replaced Abram Smith on the Wisconsin
court in 1859 and led the court's continuing defense of states' rights after the
war. 28 The court was not monolithic: Chief Justice Dixon continued to assert
the federalist sentiments he had articlated in his 1859 Booth opinion, and as a
result, the vote of the court's third justice, Orsamus Cole, was often decisive.
The Wisconsin court resumed its defense of states' rights in a series of
29
cases in 1869 and 1870, all but one of which involved federal removal laws.1
Congress enacted the first removal law in 1789: Section 12 of the Judiciary
Act allowed removal of cases between citizens of different states from state to
federal court.' 30 The only other important prewar removal law was an 1833
law that allowed removal of disputes involving federal tax and revenue
laws. 131 The Civil War and Reconstruction brought a rapid expansion of the
removal laws. In 1863, Congress provided for removal of suits against federal
officers; 32 in 1866, it allowed removal in certain cases involving incomplete
diversity;' 33 and in 1866 and 1867, it enacted two removal measures designed
to help freedmen secure justice in Southern federal courts when they could not
do so in state courts. The 1866 Civil Rights Act granted the right of removal
to all civil and criminal defendants who were not accorded the basic civil
rights granted by the Act and to persons prosecuted for administering the Act
127. See infra notes 237-51, 266-69 and accompanying text.
128. See Ableman v. Booth, 11 Wis. 498, 499 (1859).
129. See infra notes 138-63 and accompanying text.
130. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 79 (1789).
131. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632, § 3 (1833). For a general survey and chronology
of removal laws from 1789 through the end of Reconstruction, see JOHN F. DILLON, REMOVAL OF
CAUSES FROM STATE COURTS TO FEDERAL COURTS §§ 1-8 (3d ed. 1881).
132. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 756 (1863).
133. Specifically, the 1866 statute allowed defendants who did not reside in the same state as
plaintiff to remove the claims against them to federal court where such claims could be decided
without the presence of the non-diverse defendants. Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306, 307
(1866).
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or functions of the Freedman's Bureau. 134 The 1867 laws creating
congressional Reconstruction allowed either party in a diversity case to
remove the case by filing an affidavit stating a belief that "from prejudice or
local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such State court. ' 35 In
1868, removal jurisdiction was expanded to include disputes involving
federally chartered corporations, 36 and the final removal statute of the era,
enacted in 1875, allowed removal of all matters "arising under
137 the
Constitution or laws of the United States" and exceeding $500 in value.
In Akerly v. Vilas, 138 Paine served notice that the struggle over states'
rights in Wisconsin was about to resume. Acting pursuant to the 1867
Removal Act, the plaintiff in Akerly removed a suit to federal court that he
originally filed in state court. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff had not followed the procedures prescribed by the 1867 Act; the
court did not address the Act's validity, but Paine went out of his way to
suggest that he wished to overturn the Act. He reasoned that because the
United States Constitution did not create any jurisdiction whatsoever139 over
state courts, it did not authorize Congress to enact any removal statutes.
Three landmark decisions for American federalism, Knorr v. Home
Insurance Co. of New York, 140 Whiton v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway
Co., 14 1 and In re Tarble,142 followed soon thereafter. In Knorr, Cole separated
from Paine and joined Dixon to uphold a corporate defendant's right to
remove a case under the 1868 Removal Act. 143 Cole affirmed that, like Paine,
he believed the Constitution did not authorize Congress to enact removal laws
and that section 12 of the 1789 Judiciary Act was unconstitutional, but he
reluctantly recognized the Supreme Court would uphold the removal power if
an appeal was taken.' 44 Cole stated he was no longer prepared to fight the
Federal Court because resistance "would be of no earthly advantage, that I can
see, to any person or any principle.' 45 Paine responded to his colleagues with
134. The 1866 Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
135. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 195, 14 Stat. 558, 559 (1867).
136. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 225, 15 Stat. 227 (1868).
137. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 7, 18 Stat. 114 (1875).
138. 24 Wis. 165 (1869).
139. Id. at 180-81.
140. 25 Wis. 143 (1869).
141. 25 Wis. 424 (1870), rev'd, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871).
142. 25 Wis. 390 (1870), rev'd, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
143. Knorr,25 Wis. at 149-50.
144. Id. at 143-49.
145. Id. at 149. Cole cited Moseley v. Chamberlain, 18 Wis. 700 (1861), in which he and Paine
had rejected an attempt to remove a case to federal court on diversity grounds based on their belief
that Congress had no power to create removal jurisdiction. Id. at 704-05 (Dixon, J., dissenting).
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a lengthy, anguished, and unusually frank defense of his philosophy. He
conceded his interpositionist views might have been shaped by his prewar
belief that slavery must be resisted at any cost, but he argued that the fact that
interposition had come to be identified with the Confederacy did not make the
doctrine any less valid:
Secession is revolutionary; states rights not. Secession seeks to
withdraw and overthrow the powers admitted to have been delegated
to the federal government. States rights makes no such effort ....

It is natural enough, in view of our late rebellion, that the tendencies in
the popular, and perhaps in the legal, mind should be toward a strong
assertion of federal power; and that those who were advocates of state
rights, when the northern states were turned into hunting ground for
fugitive slaves.., should now be ready to brand the doctrine as a
pestilential heresy. But these fluctuations in the popular feeling and
opinion can have no legitimate influence upon the question of legal
interpretatibn.... [U]nder our system of divided sovereignty, it is...
a question of the gravest delicacy and importance, and, at least, of
doubt, whether the states, the original sovereignties, hold their
reserved powers wholly subject to the judgment of the federal court. 4 6
Paine concluded by again warning that a federal right to review state court
destroying the independence and
decisions "could not [exist] without
147
existence of the state governments."
In Tarble and Whiton, Paine and Cole joined forces once again. In
Tarble, the father of an army recruit under the legal age of enlistment obtained
a writ from a Wisconsin state court ordering federal authorities to release the
boy. 148 Consistent with his position in the Booth controversy, Paine affirmed
that state courts had broad power to determine the jurisdiction of federal
authorities over their prisoners.149 He protested that Chief Justice Taney had
misunderstood the Wisconsin court's holding: The Wisconsin court held only
that state courts could make an initial determination as to whether the federal
courts had jurisdiction and did not hold that such a decision would stand in the
face of a contrary United States Supreme Court decision. 50 Paine suggested

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Knorr, 25 Wis. at 152-54.
Id. at 155.
In re Tarble, 25 Wis. 390, 391-92 (1870), rev'd, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
Id. at410-11.
Id. at 407.
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Taney had missed this point because of the Wisconsin court's strong language
in Booth and its resistance to taking instruction from the United States
Supreme Court on appeal, which resistance Paine conceded "was, in truth,
contrary to the entire current of authority."' 5' Paine was less than candid here:
He ignored the fact that in Booth the Wisconsin court had emphasized not
only just the right of state courts to decide issues that fell under federal
jurisdiction but also their right to decide such issues independently of federal
courts. 152 Dixon, who dissented, did not respond to Paine's arguments in
detail, but contented himself with stating that Taney's decision effectively
refuted Paine's points and that in cases involving federal military 53
service,
power to issue habeas writs rested exclusively with the federal courts.'
In the Whiton case, Cole, speaking for himself and Paine, held that the
1867 removal law was invalid because any plaintiff who filed a suit in state
court thereby waived any right to elect another forum. 54 Gone was the tone
of resignation Cole had adopted in Knorr: It was now apparent that he and
Paine would continue to look for ways to check removal. 55 Dixon, finding
himself again in the minority, argued that while the 1867 Act might encourage
gamesmanship by plaintiffs, it was still within the limits of federal jurisdiction
allowed by the Constitution. Citing his 1859 Booth opinion, the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Martin, and a contemporary Kentucky case that
upheld the 1867 Removal Act, Dixon commented that "however unnecessary
and ungracious such legislation may seem to be, or however burdensome to
the parties, it must still be upheld, so long as it is within the constitutional
'' 56
authority granted to congress.
The Tarble and Whiton decisions were promptly appealed to the Supreme
Court, which reversed both decisions in 1872 and used them to reinforce the
principles of federal supremacy Taney had enunciated in 1859.151 In Tarble,
Justice Stephen Field, speaking for the Court, quoted Taney's opinion at
length. Field emphasized it was particularly important for federal courts and
officials to be free of state interference in matters pertaining to the military
and reminded the Wisconsin court that "[t]he United States are as much
151. Id.
152. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
153. Tarble, 25 Wis. at 413.
154. Whiton v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 25 Wis. 424, 431-34 (1870).
155. Id. Dixon disagreed: He pointed out that unlike the plaintiff in Akerly, the plaintiff in
Whiton had elected to change her forum well before the state court that initially had the case
conducted a final hearing or trial. Id.at 435 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting).
156. Id.at 437 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting) (citing Eifort v. Bevins, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 460 (1866)).
The Eifort case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 211-12 below.
157. In re Tarble, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872); Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 270 (1871).
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interested in protecting the citizen from illegal restraint under their authority,
as the several States are to protect him from the like restraint under their
authority, and are no more likely to tolerate any oppression."'' 58 Field bluntly
served notice that the Supreme Court had the final word in all cases of
conflicting constitutional interpretation:
The two governments in each State stand in their respective spheres of
action in the same independent relation to each other, except in one
particular, that they would if their authority embraced distinct
territories. That particular consists in the supremacy of the authority of
the United States when any conflict arises between the two
governments. 159
In Whitton, Field elaborated on his views. He rejected Paine and Cole's
view of the 1867 removal statute as creating a species of federal appellate
jurisdiction over state courts. Rather, he stated, removal statutes activated
areas of concurrent federal jurisdiction, which had always been authorized by
the Constitution. 160 Field responded to the Wisconsin court's concerns about
procedural gamesmanship by noting that the statute was enacted in order to
combat local prejudice in state courts, that prejudice may extend to plaintiffs
as well as defendants, and that sometimes a plaintiff may not discover the
extent of the prejudice until after suit has been filed. 16'
Field also alluded to an issue that would soon become the focus of the
final phase of the nineteenth-century debate over federalism: state creation of
statutory rights enforceable only in state courts. Whitton involved a claim
under Wisconsin's wrongful death statute that recently had been amended to
provide that claims under the statute could be brought only in state court.' 6 2
Field conceded that wrongful death claims were not recognized at common
law and were purely a statutory creation; nevertheless, he held that when a
state legislature creates a general statutory right, it cannot at the same time
withdraw the right from the purview of federal jurisdiction. 63 The issue
flared up again in Wisconsin shortly after the Whitton appeal was decided. In

158. Tarble, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 411.
159. Id. at 406. Chief Justice Chase dissented, arguing that states should be permitted to issue
habeas writs with respect to persons held in federal custody, subject to final federal appellate review,
which was allowed by section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act. Id. at 412 (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
160. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 288-89.
161. ld. at 289-90.
162. 1870 Wis. Laws, ch. 56, § 22.
163. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 285-86.
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Morse v. Home Insurance Co. of New York City, 164 the Wisconsin court
upheld an 1870 state law that required insurance companies to agree not to
remove suits brought against them in Wisconsin state courts as a condition of
being licensed to do business in the state. 165 Dixon joined his colleagues 166 in
upholding the statute: He drew a fine distinction between Whitton and Morse,
reasoning that the legislature could not directly forbid corporations to remove
cases, but that it had an absolute right to regulate their right to do business in
Wisconsin and concluding that the legislature merely required them to choose
67
whether they wished to do so or wished to exercise their right of removal.
Morse was also appealed to the Supreme Court, and in 1874, the Supreme
Court again reversed the Wisconsin court.' 68 The Supreme Court drew a
distinction between voluntary waiver in a specific case and statutes requiring
69
a blanket advance waiver, holding that the latter are not permitted.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Ward Hunt viewed the Wisconsin statute as 70a
direct challenge to federal removal jurisdiction and, thus, federal authority.
Hunt conceded that the Supreme Court in past cases had indicated that a
state's right to regulate conditions of doing business within its borders was
very broad, but he emphasized that any conflict between that right and the
prerogatives of federal jurisdiction must yield to the latter.'17
The final dispute between the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court came four years later when, in Wisconsin ex rel. Drake
v. Doyle, 172 the Wisconsin court upheld an 1872 corporation law that
supplemented the Morse statute by requiring the Wisconsin Secretary of State
to revoke the license of any insurance company that removed a case to federal
court in violation of an agreement filed under the 1870 law. 173 Chief Justice
Edward Ryan, who had replaced Dixon upon the latter's resignation in 1874,

164. 30 Wis. 496 (1872).
165. Id. at 504-05.
166. Justice William Lyon had replaced Paine, who died in 1871. See JOHN B. WINSLOW, THE
STORY OF A GREAT COURT 269-70 (1912).
167. Morse, 30 Wis. at 504-05.
168. Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. City v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
169. Id. at 453-55.
170. Id. at455,458.
171. Id. at 455. Chief Justice Morrison Waite, who had replaced Chase upon the latter's death
in 1873, and Justice David Davis dissented: He concluded that Wisconsin had an absolute right to
impose any conditions it wished on doing business in the state, and he pointed out that the antiremoval provision merely put foreign corporations on the same jurisdictional footing as Wisconsin
domestic corporations (who could not remove cases based on diversity of citizenship). Id. at 458-59
(Waite, C.J., dissenting).
172. 40 Wis. 175 (1876), rev'dsub nom. Doyle v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876).
173. 1872 Wis. Laws ch. 64, 67; Drake, 40 Wis. at 176-77.
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wrote the court's decision in Doyle. Ryan, whose sharp intellect was matched
by an equally sharp personality, had mixed feelings about the federal
government: He had acted as a special federal attorney during the first phase
of the Booth proceedings in 1854 and had presented an eloquent (though
74
unsuccessful) defense of federalism to Justice Smith and his colleagues.
But during the war years, Ryan had been a bitter critic of the Lincoln
administration and the war effort, and his opposition had sent him into
professional near-oblivion for nearly a decade after the war., 75 In the Doyle
case, Ryan used his talents to craft a moderately worded opinion-very much
in the Kentucky style, as will be seen below-with which he ultimately was
able to win a reprieve for the Wisconsin licensing law and the cause of states'
rights, albeit a temporary one.
Ryan, knowing that opponents of the statute would rely heavily on the
United States Supreme Court's Morse decision, began by professing respect
for that decision, stating that while the Wisconsin court still thought "with all
due deference" that it was right, "it is our duty and pleasure to submit to the
decision of the federal court, on a point unquestionably within its final
jurisdiction."'' 76 Ryan then suggested that the Supreme Court would want
Morse construed narrowly, and he conceded that the Wisconsin legislature
could not destroy a corporation's right to remove a suit, although he argued
that the corporation might violate a moral compact with the people of the state
if it did so.177 Ryan then drew a key distinction that was the centerpiece of his
opinion: He reasoned that, in Morse, the United States Supreme Court had
declared agreements under the 1870 law to be unenforceable but had not
struck down the statute itself and had not prohibited Wisconsin from revoking
corporate licenses for failure to comply with such an agreement. 78 Put
another way, a corporation could not be forced to promise not to remove
cases, but neither could the state be forced to license corporations that refused
to make or keep such a promise.
Even though he knew the court's decision would almost certainly be
appealed, Ryan could not resist ending with a warning to federal authorities.
174. See ALFONS J. BEITZINGER, EDWARD G. RYAN: LION OF THE LAW 55-66 (1960); Ranney,

supra note 56, at 92-93.
175. BEITZINGER, supra note 174, at 67-103.
176. Drake, 40 Wis. at 189.
177. Id. at 191-93.
178. Id.at 193-94. The United States Supreme Court's Morse decision was unclear on this
point. Hunt had stated that "[w]e do not consider the question whether the State of Wisconsin can
entirely exclude such corporations from its limits, nor what reasonable terms they may impose as a
condition of their transacting business within the State." Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. City v. Morse, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 455 (1874). But, he also stated in broad terms that the 1870 statute was
"repugnant to the Constitution of the United States ... and ...illegal and void." Id. at 458.
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He concluded with a version of Paine's original states' rights credo, toned
down to reflect Ryan's view of the changed realities that the war and
Reconstruction had brought to America, which he undoubtedly hoped would
give the Supreme Court pause:
We abide by the letter and spirit of the constitution. Unfortunately
many things in its administration are tending toward centralization,
which the history and temper of the American people give grave
warning might be closely followed by disintegration. The integrity of
the union has been tried. The integrity of the states is on trial. Much
rests upon the moderation and forbearance of the federal courts; as
much perhaps upon the firmness of the state courts, refusing to
abdicate state authority, in state matters, to assumption
of federal
179
jurisdiction. We will faithfully try to do our part.
Ryan's strategy worked: A divided Supreme Court upheld the Wisconsin
statute. Justice Hunt, again speaking for the Court, was reluctant to interfere
in any way with state power over the incorporation and licensing process and
concluded that even if Wisconsin's licensing law was intended to impede
removal, "emotion or a mental proceeding... is not the subject of inquiry in
determining the validity of a statute."' 8 0 Justice Joseph Bradley, joined by
Justices Noah Swayne and Samuel Miller, dissented. They viewed Doyle as a
direct contest between state power over incorporation and federal power to
exercise constitutional jurisdiction and argued that the latter must prevail
because "prohibition [of licensure], except upon conditions derogatory to the
jurisdiction and sovereignty of the United States, is mischievous, and
productive of hostility and disloyalty to the general government.''8
B. Kentucky: A Loyalty Sorely Tested (Part2)
The Civil War strained relations between Kentucky and the federal
government nearly to the breaking point. Kentucky's unionism was deeprooted, having been "born of long periods of isolation in bearing the brunt of
the American Revolution west of the Alleghenies"; 82 by the beginning of the
179. Drake, 40 Wis. at 216-17. Ryan noted that the federal district court in Madison had
recently enjoined the Wisconsin Secretary of State from revoking a corporate license in such a case,
and he complained, citing Chisholm, among other cases, that the United States Supreme Court had
consistently used the implied powers doctrine to extend the scope of federal jurisdiction further than
the Constitution allowed. Id. at 199-204, 216-17.
180. Doyle v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 541 (1876).
181. Id. at 543 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
182. Thomas L. Connelly, Neo-Confederatism or Power Vacuum: Post- War Kentucky Politics
Reappraised,64 REG. KY. HIST. SOC. 257, 259 (1966).
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war, it had evolved into "a complex of fierce love for the Union [and] violent
opposition to any infringement of the state's constitutional rights or
interference in the state's affairs."'' 83 Both the Union and the Confederacy
viewed control of Kentucky as vital, and after the Kentucky legislature
1862.184
rejected secession, Confederate forces mounted a major invasion in
The Lincoln administration imposed strict martial law on the state for much of
the war, and Union army camps attracted many escaped slaves and their
families whom federal officials declined to return to their owners. Such
actions were bitterly resented by virtually all political factions in the state .85
Partly as a result, Kentucky stoutly opposed federal postwar reconstruction
measures and expanded rights for freed slaves, so much so that one historian
Kentucky as the only state that "waited until after the war to
has characterized
86
secede.'

As a result, during the Civil War and Reconstruction years the Kentucky
Supreme Court had a more difficult job than ever of maintaining a balance
between states' rights and federalism. The court itself was divided: Justice
Rufus Williams, a strong Unionist, frequently dissented in cases involving
and his
challenges to federal authority, and the debate between Williams
87
colleagues sheds much light on divisions in the state as a whole.'
The first major test for the Kentucky court came in the case of Norris v.
Doniphan, in which a wartime federal law providing for confiscation of
property of persons aiding the rebellion was challenged. 88 The court avoided
a direct discussion of federalism and reached a mixed decision: It held that the
law violated due process because it did not give the Kentuckian who was the
target of confiscation the right of trial to determine whether he was in fact a
rebel sympathizer, but it also held that if he were found to be an "alien
enemy," his right to sue to recover property would be suspended for the
duration of the war.' 89 Williams suggested that rebel sympathizers were
presumptively alien enemies because they had no right to withdraw their
allegiance from the United States at will. He reviewed the history of the
debate over federalism in nearly as much detail as had Justice Benning in
Padelford,but he reached a considerably different conclusion: He argued that
the United States Constitution "is more than a compact' ' 90 and expressed his
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
6 MCPHERSON, supra note 6, at 293-97.
COULTER, supra note 13, at 145-51, 166-70, 207-08.
Id. at vii.
See infra notes 188-222 and accompanying text.
61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385 (1863).
Id.at 401-02.
Id.at 405.
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concept of the relationship between federal and state power by stating: "This
[federal] government is not sovereign, but it is supreme, and designed to be
perpetual."' 9 1 Williams concluded by explicitly affirming that the United
States Supreme Court had the final say as to the constitutionality of all
laws. 192
In Griswold v. Hepburn,'93 the court was asked to decide the validity of
the Legal Tender Act of 1863, which transformed the national economy and
facilitated the financing of the war by creating federal paper currency for the
first time. 194 By 1865 it was clear, to the regret of most Kentuckians, that the
federal presence in Kentucky was transforming the state permanently, most
notably by eroding slavery and hastening its end in the state.' 95 In Griswold,
the court addressed this transformation for the first time, and once again it
strove to find middle ground. Chief Justice George Robertson, speaking for
the majority, began with a lengthy meditation on the nature of federalism. He
likened the states to planets orbiting the federal sun and took a fatalistic
approach to the future of federalism: "This new and beautiful organism is yet
in the course of practical development, which may soon prove whether its
fundamental equilibrium of local and national power is in most danger of
disturbance from the centrifugal tendencies
of the States, or the centripetal
'1 96
attractions of the central government."
The court ultimately concluded that the Legal Tender Act was
unconstitutional, reasoning that the Constitution gave Congress power only to
coin money and that to read the Constitution to give implied permission to
Congress to issue paper treasury notes as currency "would have devoured all
the other powers and resolved the national government into despotic
anarchy.' 97 However, the court explicitly recognized that the Supreme Court
would have the final say on whether the Act was constitutional and made
clear it would defer to such decision. 198 Williams again dissented, arguing
191. Id.at 409-10.
192. Id. at 439. However, Williams agreed with his colleagues that the law violated due
process, and he argued that even treason did not permit seizure of the traitor's property. Id at 42325.
193. 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 20 (1865), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870),
overruled by Second Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
194. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 73, 12 Stat. 709 (1863).
195. COULTER, supra note 13, at 197-204, 247, 258-6 1.
196. Griswold, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) at 23.
197. Id. at 27. The Kentucky court was the only state court that struck down the Act:
Numerous other state courts, including the Wisconsin Supreme Court, upheld the Act. Breitenbach
v. Turner, 18 Wis. 148 (1864); 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1888, at 698-99 n.70 (1971).
198. Griswold, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) at 22. The United States Supreme Court subsequently affirmed
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that the court should defer to Congress unless the Act was clearly
unconstitutional and that if state courts were to unduly second-guess the
federal government's wartime measures, the United States "must vanish from
the world as a thing of the past, and with its downfall 1must
go the last
99
brightest evidence of man's capability for self-government."'
During the same term, the Kentucky court struck down two wartime laws
affecting slavery. In Corbin v. Marsh,2 °° it held that an 1864 federal law
freeing families of black soldiers20 1 was unconstitutional because it deprived
loyal slaveowners of property without compensation and placed a
discriminatory share of the war's cost upon them. In Hughes v. Todd,202 the
Kentucky court held that another 1864 law authorizing impressment of slaves
for war service 20 3 effected an unconstitutional taking of property in the case of
slaves worth more than the statutory compensation limit of $300.204 The court
used these cases to express openly its unhappiness with federal policy:
"[U]nder what pretense," asked Justice George Robertson, "could Congress
assume power to abolish slavery in Kentucky, a devoted union State, always
for a restoration of the union, and nothing more nor less?, 20 5 Justice Williams
once again dissented, arguing as he had in Griswold that such measures were
justified under Congress's broad war powers.20 6 Williams responded to
Robertson's complaints about federal overreaching by relying on the
American people as the ultimate repository of safety. In language reminiscent
of the early federalists' view of the national government as a direct creature of
the people rather than of the states, he argued that in case of overreaching, the
the Kentucky court's decision in part and reversed it in part, holding that the Legal Tender Act was
unconstitutional insofar as it applied to contracts made before its enactment. Hepburn v. Griswold,

75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 610, 624-26 (1870). A year later, after two new justices had joined the
Supreme Court, it overruled its Griswold decision and upheld the Act without qualification by a 5-4
vote. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). The two cases were quite controversial; a
full description of the controversy is given in 6 FAIRMAN, supra note 197, at 692-763.
199. Griswold, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) at 67 (Williams, J., dissenting). One detects in Williams'
language the influence of Abraham Lincoln's second annual message to Congress ("In giving
freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free .... We shall nobly save or meanly lose the last,
best hope of earth," Abraham Lincoln's Second Annual Message to Congress, in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 415 (Library of America 1989)) and the

Gettysburg Address ("It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us...
that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth,"
Gettysburg Address, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, supra, at 536).

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 193 (1865).
Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 297, 13 Stat. 389 (1864).
63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 188 (1865).
Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, 13 Stat. 6, 11 (1864).
Hughes, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) at 191-92.
Corbin, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) at 197-98.
Id. at 202 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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people could elect new representatives to Congress within a short period of
time. 207
The following year the court addressed the validity of federal removal
laws for the first time. In Short v. Wilson, 20 8 a Union army officer was sued in
state court for taking the plaintiffs horse during the war; he removed the suit
to federal court under the 1863 Removal Act. The Kentucky Supreme Court
delivered a message of opposition to the removal law, but it did so in a much
more indirect manner than the Wisconsin Supreme Court did. The Kentucky
court noted that the state legislature had recently enacted a law authorizing
appeal of removals 20 9' and it relied on the statute for its jurisdiction. The
statute was a legislative embodiment of Justice Paine's view (subsequently
expressed in Tarble) that state courts were not bound to cede all questions of
jurisdiction to federal courts once removal had taken place, but were free to
evaluate the validity of removal notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause. But
the Kentucky court studiously ignored its opportunity to express solidarity
with the legislature's view: Instead, it concentrated on the issue of whether the
defendant had complied with the procedural requirements of the federal
removal statute and concluded that he had not.2 10 Soon afterward, the court
tacitly disavowed any support for Paine's position in Eifort v. Bevins. 211 In
Eifort, a man detained by federal officials sued them in state court for
wrongful imprisonment; the officials removed the case to federal court, and
the Kentucky court held the federal removal acts must be212observed "even
though they might be deemed unnecessary and ungracious.
The issue that created the most postwar friction between Kentuckians and
the federal government was whether blacks should be allowed to testify in
court. Immediately after the war, most ex-Confederate states enacted "black
codes," which prescribed certain basic civil rights for the freed slaves, such as
the right to make contracts and hold property. However, the codes also
preserved many slave-era restrictions and signaled to Northerners that the
South had not truly accepted the result of the war. 213 In response, Congress
enacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which, among other things, allowed blacks
to testify without restriction in all federal courts and permitted defendants in
state courts that did not allow black testimony to remove their cases to federal
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 232-33 (Williams, J., dissenting).
64 Ky. (I Bush) 350 (1866); see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
1866 Ky. Acts ch. 690.
Short, 64 Ky. (I Bush) at 352-54.
64 Ky. (1 Bush) 460 (1866).
Id. at461.
See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877,

at 199-205 (1988); THEODORE B. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 61-80 (1965).
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Most Southern states subsequently enacted constitutional or statutory
provisions allowing black testimony, but Kentucky refused to do so. 21 5 As a
result, many black Kentuckians removed their cases to Judge Bland Ballard's
federal district court, and because of recurring incidents of violence against
blacks, civil rights cases made up a large portion of Ballard's docket after
1866.16 The testimonial and removal provisions of the 1866 Act triggered
deep resentment in Kentucky, particularly after Supreme Court Justice Noah
Swayne, sitting as a district judge in Kentucky, rejected a constitutional
challenge to those provisions.217
When the testimonial issue came before the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Bowlin v. Commonwealth,2 18 the court departed from its tradition of trying to
strike a balance between state and federal concerns: It protested that Congress
had invaded the state's "unquestionable right to regulate her own domestic
concerns, and prescribe remedies, including rules of evidence, in cases in her
own courts., 2 1 9 The court's opinion reflected an interesting mix of racism and
genuine states' rights concerns:
court.

2 14

[Federal civil rights measures] would place the black race, in all the
States, under the pupilage of Congress, free from the control of the
local sovereign that governs the white race, and ought to have the
same jurisdiction over all citizens, black as well as white .... Such a
monstrous construction... would yield to the arbitrary will of
Congress absolute control over the interests and destiny of the black
race, and the like control over the white race, so far as its rights might,
in the opinion of Congress, conflict with the interest of the blacks. 2 0

214. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
215. See Victor B. Howard, The Black Testimony Controversy in Kentucky, 1866-1872, in 12
BLACK SOUTHERNERS AND THE LAW, 1865-1900, at 162 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994). Kentucky
judges were not prohibited from allowing black testimony, but only one, William Goodloe of
Lexington, allowed such testimony in his court. Goodloe was a radical Unionist who warned blacks
in one public speech that: "Your testimony must be admitted, otherwise you may be beaten and
robbed nightly ... your ministers may be shot down every Sabbath in your pulpits, without
impunity." Id.at 176-77 (citations omitted).
216. Id.at 169-70, 172-75.
217. United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151). Swayne took a
broad view of the federal government's power to assist freed blacks, commenting that if the courts
the worst effects of
were to "[bilot out [the 1866] act and deny the constitutional power to pass it....
slavery might speedily follow. It would be a virtual abrogation of the [Thirteenth] [A]mendment
[abolishing slavery]." Id. at 794.
218. 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5 (1867).
219. Id. at 7.
220. Id.at 9.
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Even Justice Williams made clear that the limits of his support for
federalism had been reached. In his view, the 1866 Act improperly gave
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of all cases in states whose laws did not
permit blacks to testify and put state judges at risk of being prosecuted for
enforcing such laws. 2 ' Williams believed that the Act was a palpable
invasion of state internal affairs and that:
if [the federal government] can do this, no subject is perceived upon
which it may not regulate for the several States, and thus the people of
Kentucky must be legislated for by the people of Massachusetts in
matters in which they can have no direct information or presumed
interest, and vice versa.222
The opinions in Bowlin suggest that if the federal government had
continued to interpret the 1866 Act broadly, at some point the Kentucky court
might have joined Byron Paine in mounting a direct challenge to federal
removal statutes. But in the early 1870s, the issue was defused. Opponents of
the 1866 Act searched for cases that could be used to test its constitutionality
in the United States Supreme Court; one such case, Blyew v. United States,
originated in Kentucky.22 3 In Blyew, the defendant, who was charged with the
murder of a black family, argued that because murder was a state and not a
federal crime, federal courts had no jurisdiction over the crime and could not
obtain jurisdiction solely under the 1866 Act.224 In late 1868, Judge Ballard
rejected the argument, and his decision was promptly appealed.225 The appeal
remained on the Supreme Court docket for several years, and in the meantime,
pressure built in Kentucky for resolution of the testimonial controversy: An
increasing number of political and bar leaders supported allowance of such
testimony as the best means of reducing federal power in the state.226 In 1872,
the legislature enacted a law allowing black testimony, 227 and soon thereafter
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Blyew: It held that federal
jurisdiction under the 1866 Act was valid in all cases when state officials
directly failed to enforce black citizens' property and liberty rights, but that

221. Id. at 28-29 (Williams, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 30 (Williams, J., dissenting).
223. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1871).
224. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 133-35 (1985); see Blyew, 80

U.S. (13 Wall.) at 586-88.
225. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 224, at 135; LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Nov. 29, 1868, at 4.
226. Howard, supra note 215, at 180-87.
227. 1871-72 Ky. Acts ch. 139.
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the mere denial of black testimony did not amount to such a failure.228
Ballard then concluded that his jurisdiction was "at an end" as to the
testimonial controversy, and the number of civil rights cases in his court fell
dramatically thereafter.22 9
C. Georgia: States' Rights in a Reconstructed State
Georgia, like most of the former Confederate states, had several changes
of government during the Reconstruction era. Under President Andrew
Johnson's initial Reconstruction program (1865-67), native Unionists, many
of whom were members of Georgia's prewar elite, were allowed to operate
the state government. Johnson appointed Charles Jenkins, who had served on
the Georgia Supreme Court during the war years, 230 as provisional governor
and retained Joseph Lumpkin as chief justice of the "Restoration" supreme
court. Lumpkin was joined by Dawson Walker and Iverson Harris, both
moderate Unionists.2 31 In early 1867, Congress concluded that the former
Confederate states had not made satisfactory progress in giving basic legal
rights to the freed slaves and enacted its own Reconstruction program: The
states were placed under military occupation and were notified that their
representatives would not be seated in Congress until they ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment and enacted new state constitutions that guaranteed
black suffrage.232 In Georgia, unlike some other states, military authorities
did not remove the sitting justices, but when a new constitution was enacted in
1868, a new "Reconstruction" court was created, and two new justices, Joseph
E. Brown and Henry K. McCay, were appointed. Hiram Warner, a moderate
Unionist who had replaced Lumpkin 233
upon the latter's death in 1867, was
reappointed under the new constitution.
228. Blyew, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 591-94 (Swayne, J., and Bradley, J., dissenting).
229. LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Mar. 23, 1872, at 3 (charge to grand jury); see KACZOROWSKI,
supra note 224, at 142.
230. See supra note 119.
231. Walker and Harris were not politically active, but devoted their energies to their legal
careers. After leaving the bench, Walker joined the new Georgia Republican party and was its
candidate for governor in 1872. A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, supra note 99, at
90 (Walker), 90-91 (Harris). Walker and Harris replaced Jenkins and Richard F. Lyon, both of
whom were conservatives sympathetic to states' rights. Id at 88 (Lyon), 89 (Jenkins). Some states,
such as Texas, had a high turnover of court personnel during Reconstruction; others, such as North
Carolina, did not. See Joseph A. Ranney, A Fool's Errand? Legal Legacies of Reconstruction in
Two Southern States, 9 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 1, 5-10 (2002).
232. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867).
233. Like many Reconstruction-era lawmakers, each of these justices went through a major
political conversion during the era. Both Warner and McCay were born in the North and moved to
Georgia as young men; both were strong Unionists, and Warner was one of the few delegates to
Georgia's 1861 secession convention who voted against secession. After the war, McCay became a
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Thanks mainly to the enactment of black suffrage, Republican Unionists
were able to control Georgia for a time, but they soon dissolved into factions,
and as a result, Georgia returned to conservative control in 1872.234 The new
"Redeemer" administration retained Warner, who had proven more
conservative than his Reconstruction court colleagues, 235 but appointed
conservatives to the other two seats. 236 Despite their distinct differences in
outlook, both the Restoration and Reconstruction justices were disinclined to
challenge federal primacy, particularly as to jurisdictional issues. Somewhat
surprisingly, after Reconstruction ended in Georgia, the Redeemer justices
followed their lead.
The Georgia court showed deference to federal authority in a number of
ways. In Jones v. Harker,237 the Restoration court, unlike its Kentucky
counterpart, upheld the validity of the Legal Tender Act with little comment.
Justice Harris objected to the Act, but even he made clear he was not willing
to take a stand against it. Harris protested that the implied powers doctrine,
under which the power to circulate paper money had been defended, "makes
the powers of Congress unlimited, and subverts the Constitution itself, ' 238 but

he mistakenly believed the United States Supreme Court had already upheld
that Act,23 9 and like his colleagues, he conceded that "the decisions of that
Court, in the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, are made
obligatory upon the judgments rendered here., 240
After 1868, the
Republican; Warner did not. A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, supra note 99, at
48-49 (Warner), 91-92 (McCay). Brown is an important figure in Georgia history: He "traveled the
political dial from doctrinaire state rights Democrat and secessionist to Radial Republican scalawag
and finally to Bourbon Democrat without more than temporary loss of face or fortune or his essential
popularity in Georgia." Id. at 94 (citation omitted). Brown served only briefly on the Georgia
Supreme Court, resigning in 1870 to resume his political career. Id. at 93-94
234. CONWAY, supra note 12, at 190-95.
235. See infra notes 241-51 and accompanying text.
236. Brown's seat was filled by Osborne Lochrane (1870-72), William Montgomery (1872-73),
Robert Trippe (1873-74) and finally by James Jackson (1875-87). McCay's term ended in 1875, and
he was succeeded by Logan Bleckley (1875-80). Montgomery, Trippe, Jackson, and Bleckley all

served the Confederacy as government officials or soldiers during the war; however, only
Montgomery and Trippe filled major political posts. Like their Restoration and Reconstruction court
colleagues, they devoted most of their energies to law rather than politics. See A HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, supra note 99, at 97, 102, 125-26 (Lochrane), 126-27 (Montgomery),
127-28 (Trippe), 128-29 (Jackson), 129-30 (Bleckley).
237. 37 Ga. 503 (1867).
238. Id. at 507.
239. Id. at 504 (citing Thompson v. Riggs, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 663 (1863)). In Thompson, the
Supreme Court did not decide the constitutionality of the Act but held only that when a bank deposit
was made in coin, the bank became the owner of the money deposited and could pay its debt to the
depositor in any legal tender. Thompson, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 677-80; see also 6 FAIRMAN, supra

note 197, at 701.
240. Jones, 37 Ga. at 504-05.
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Reconstruction court dealt with federalism primarily in the context of removal
disputes. Most of the Georgia removal cases involved the issues of whether
complete diversity of citizenship was required for removal and how residence
should be determined for diversity purposes. 24' The court did not always
allow removal, but in no case did it challenge the removal statutes as being
beyond the scope of federal jurisdiction under the Constitution.242 In Mayor
of Macon v. Cummins,243 the Georgia court spoke up for the federal courts in
language that the recently deceased Judge Benning would have abhorred:
Both [the federal and state courts] are Courts of our own creation, and
each is intended for the public good-the good of the State and the
people of the State, as well as the people of other States. It is not a
foreign Court, but a Court sitting under a Constitution and laws made
by and for the State and people of Georgia.244
The supreme courts of many ex-Confederate states engaged in debate over
whether secession should be treated as "state suicide" or whether the states
had continued to exist with all their inherent rights of sovereignty
notwithstanding secession. Some courts, most notably the Texas Supreme
Court, came close to adopting the state suicide theory: They voided virtually
all laws enacted by Confederate state governments that came before them for
review, and they used their powers to try to persuade their constituents to
2 45
accept both the letter and the spirit of federal reconstruction policies.
Georgia did not go this far, but in Hardeman v. Downer,246 the Reconstruction
court touched on the issue when it upheld a state debtor exemption clause in
the state's 1868 Reconstruction constitution 247 and rejected a claim that

retrospective application of the clause impaired the contract rights of
creditors. Justices Brown and McCay both voted to uphold the law primarily
as a matter of federal deference. Brown bluntly stated that Congress as "the

241. Bliss & Co. v. Rawson, 43 Ga. 181 (1871). In Hines & Hobbs v. Rawson, 40 Ga. 356
(1869), the court held that where foreclosure proceedings against a debtor had been brought in state
court and were well advanced, a creditor could not bring separate foreclosure proceedings in federal
court. Id.at 359-60. However, the court held that the state court should not have dismissed the
separate federal proceeding because "it is best to keep up the proper distinctions, especially on so
delicate a question as an apparent conflict of jurisdiction between Courts equally supreme." Id at
360.
242. See cases cited supra note 241 and infra note 243.
243. 47 Ga. 321 (1872).
244. Id. at 327.
245. See Ranney, supra note 231, at 11-13.
246. 39 Ga. 425 (1869).
247. GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VII, § 1.
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2 48
conquering government.., had the power to approve and sanction it";

McCay more circumspectly characterized the clause as "an adjustment of the
political relations between the State and the United States, which had been
disturbed by the revolution." 249 Warner, dissenting, argued that the
exemptions were a serious impairment of contract and charged that the only
line of reasoning his colleagues could employ to support them was to assume
that Georgia was not a state in the Union at the time the constitution was
adopted.
Warner made clear his opinion that Georgia had never lost its
status as a state and its related rights. 1
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF RECONSTRUCTION

In hindsight, the Supreme Court's Tarble and Whitton decisions marked
the end of the nineteenth century debate over federalism. By 1880, removal
was not only an established part of the American legal system but also was
common enough to merit its own legal treatise. 2 Perhaps the most telling
evidence that federal primacy had been secured is the fact that the treatise
author, Professor John Dillon of Columbia University, did not feel compelled
to explain or defend removal but simply celebrated it:
If we consider the intricate nature of the relations of the Federal and
State governments; ... that the two classes of courts sit in the same

territory, and exercise day by day jurisdiction over the same subjects
and the same persons; that the judicial system provided by the
Judiciary Act [of 1789] was untried and experimental; that serious
conflicts between the State and Federal Courts have been almost
wholly avoided; that the Judiciary Act remains, after the lapse of
nearly a century, almost intact,-it will appear that the admiration with
which it has been regarded by statesmen, lawyers and judges, is not
undeserved.25 3
From Dillon's comment that "serious conflicts have been almost wholly
avoided," one would hardly know the struggles over federalism during the
early nineteenth century 254 and the postwar restiveness of the Wisconsin and

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Hardeman, 39 Ga. at 447.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id. at 460, 465 (warner, J., dissenting).
DILLON, supra note 131, passim.
Id. § 1, at 2.
See supra notes 28-119 and accompanying text.
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Kentucky courts 255 had ever occurred. Dillon notwithstanding, the debate was
not quite over: The small pocket of state primacy over corporation laws that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court had preserved in the Doyle case continued to be
a subject of sporadic debate into the early twentieth century.256
Kentucky's Supreme Court weighed in on this subject in Commonwealth
v. East Tennessee Coal Co. 2 57 and Prewitt v. Security Mutual Life Insurance
Co.258 In East Tennessee Coal, the court struck down a Kentucky antiremoval statute similar to Wisconsin' S259 and took a strong federalist stance.
The Kentucky court concluded that Doyle had been too narrowly interpreted
over the years and that the real meaning of Doyle was that "any legislation on
part of the state by which it is proposed or designed to take away that
privilege [removal], even under the power of the state to fix the terms upon
which the corporation may enter that state for the purpose of doing business,
is unconstitutional and void., 260 However, Prewitt presented the issue that the
Supreme Court had mentioned but not decided in Doyle: namely, whether
revocation of a corporate license after removal would be allowed. Here, the
Kentucky court tacitly retreated from the broad language of East Tennessee
Coal: It held that the states had broad power to revoke as well as issue
licenses and that the anti-removal law merely put foreign corporations on the
same footing as Kentucky corporations. 261 Two justices dissented in Prewitt.
They argued forcefully that to allow revocation was the equivalent of forcing
corporations to agree to anti-removal provisions as a condition of licensure,
which Doyle had prohibited, and that it also amounted to nullification of
federal removal laws.262 The dissenters were concerned that Prewitt would be
seen as a new states' rights manifesto, and accordingly, they went out of their
way to defend federalism. They argued that the policy of removal laws to
protect out-of-state litigants from local prejudice benefitted Kentuckians in
other states, and they reminded their colleagues in language reminiscent of the
Georgia Reconstruction court's language in Cummins263 that "it is a narrow
255. See supra notes 128-222 and accompanying text.
256. See infra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
257. 30 S.W. 608 (Ky. 1895).
258. 83 S.W. 611 (Ky. 1904).
259. See E. Tenn. Coal, 30 S.W. at 608 (reciting the relevant language of Ky. Stats. § 572
(1895)).
260. Id. at 610.
261. Prewitt, 83 S.W. at 614. The court's language is reminiscent of Chief Justice Waite's
dissent in Morse. See supra note 171. The court distinguished East Tennessee Coal on the ground
that the statute at issue in that case imposed criminal penalties for removal and did not involve
license revocation. Id.
262. Prewitt v. Sec. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 84 S.W. 527, 527 (Ky. 1905) (Barker, J., dissenting).
263. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
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and provincial view to regard these national laws as harsh and severe edicts
imposed by a foreign suzerain, instead of benignant laws imposed by
' 264
ourselves in the interest of a broad and national justice.
The controversy over state corporation law anti-removal provisions was
finally laid to rest in 1921 when the Supreme Court, frankly admitting that
Doyle and subsequent decisions concerning corporation law anti-removal
provisions "can not be reconciled," held that anti-removal provisions and all
governmental acts implementing such provisions, including license
revocation, constituted illegal obstruction of federal judicial power.265
Since that time, there has been strikingly little discussion of states' rights
issues in the supreme courts of the three states studied here. Debate briefly
flared up in the Georgia Supreme Court in the 1930s over the issue of whether
the states could tax federal war pension payments that Congress had decreed
would be tax free. 26 6 In City of Atlanta v. Stokes (1932), Justice Sterling Price
Gilbert, in a passionate dissent, argued that the federal government could not
restrict the state's power to tax in any way,267 but Chief Justice Richard
Russell, speaking for the majority, disagreed. Citing Tarble among other
authorities, Russell stated that the federal government's power to impose
conditions on benefits it granted "has never been questioned by even the most
ardent states rights men, 268 and unequivocally affirmed the primacy of federal
power: "Neither government can intrude within the jurisdiction, or authorize
any interference therein by its judicial officers with the action of the other.
But whenever any conflict arises between the enactments of the two
sovereignties, or in the enforcement of their asserted authorities, those of the
269
national government are supreme.

No new debates have flared up in Kentucky or Wisconsin since 1921:
Both states' supreme courts have increasingly treated the states' rights debate
as a historical curiosity. As long ago as 1944, the Kentucky court commented
laconically that while early nineteenth century cases such as M'Cullough v.
264. Prewitt, 84 S.W. at 532 (Barker, J., dissenting).
265. Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532-33 (1922).
266. City of Atlanta v. Stokes, 165 S.E. 270 (Ga. 1932); Rucker v. Merck, 159 S.E. 501 (Ga.
1931).
267. Stokes, 165 S.E. at 278-84.
268. Id. at 272.
269. Id. at 276. But Russell also stated that Gilbert's general defense of states' rights was
"splendid" and "meets my highest approbation." Id. at 271; see also Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Evans,
99 S.E.2d 220, 222 (Ga. 1957) (holding that Georgia had the right to tax personal property of a
private corporation located on federal land provided that such taxation did not interfere with federal
activities, but averring that federal law is the supreme law of the land and that "[n]o doubt ... can be
reasonably entertained as to the unflinching loyalty and respect of Georgia for the Constitution of the
United States").
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Maryland2 70 "did not quell the doctrine of 'State Supremacy within State
Boundaries' sufficiently to avert the Civil War, we are disposed in the light of
that event, to recognize them as binding upon us." '271 In an unusual 1973 case,
the Wisconsin court peremptorily restrained a state court judge who had
attempted to enjoin a federal judge from proceeding in a civil rights lawsuit
272
challenging the validity of actions taken by the state judge in a related case.
Three concurring justices complained that federal courts were interfering too
much in state affairs through collateral civil rights actions and called on
federal judges to abstain from doing SO. 27 3 But even the concurring justices
did not seriously challenge federal courts' right to proceed in such situations.
Tellingly, they cited Booth, but referred to the controversy between their
predecessors and Taney as merely "a bit of fascinating legal history. ,,274
V. CONCLUSION
The career of the states' rights doctrine in Wisconsin, Kentucky, and
Georgia confirms the truism that the Civil War era transformed American
federalism and dealt a lasting blow to states' rights sentiment. But the states
studied here suggest two important qualifications to that truism: First, there
was a culture of respect for federalism in the state courts from the nation's
beginning, but, second, states' rights did not go out quietly after the war, even
within the judiciary.
The first point is particularly borne out by Kentucky and Georgia. Both
states' governors and legislators openly defied federal authority and
proclaimed the virtues of independent state action on several occasions before
the Civil War when they felt their interests were directly threatened,275 but the
courts of both states declined to follow suit. 276 Kentucky's judges probably
were influenced by the state's abiding attachment to the concept of union,
notwithstanding periodic temporary grievances against the federal
270. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
271. Chilcutt v. Watts, Inc., 180 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Ky. 1944).
272. In re Reynolds, 206 N.W.2d 428, 429 (Wis. 1973).
273. Id. at 431-32 (Hallows, C.J., concurring).
274. Id. at 433 (Hallows, C.J., concurring). It should be emphasized that state courts have not
completely abandoned consideration of the intersection of federal and state laws: For example, they
regularly consider whether state laws are preempted by similar federal laws. It might be argued that
state court decisions against preemption in close cases constitute a tacit blow for states' rights, but
such an argument would be strained: Preemption cases are decided based on a detailed set of legal
standards, many established by the Supreme Court, which give state courts little room for creativity
in the name of states' rights. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663-65

(1993).
275. See supra notes 28-30, 38, 86-95 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 40-45, 96-98 and accompanying text.
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government. Though severely tested during the war and Reconstruction, the
culture of judicial respect for federalism in Kentucky held. The Kentucky
Supreme Court complained loudly against perceived federal excesses in
2 78
Bowlin27 and attempted to strike down a key federal law in Griswold,
but
even in those cases it recognized that the United States Supreme Court would
have the final say and indicated it would submit.279
In Georgia, Justice Benning's states' rights manifesto in Padelfordgained
attention, but it is important to remember that his colleagues did not subscribe
to the manifesto. 280 The role that Chief Justice Lumpkin's nationalism played
in shaping the court's moderate course and the fact that Lumpkin cultivated
his nationalism through regular contacts with jurists in other states suggests
that a distinctive American judicial culture, largely resistant to the recurring
waves of political states' rights sentiment, may have evolved before the war
and continued after the war. 28 1 Not all judges cultivated outside contacts as
assiduously as Lumpkin, but a reading of prewar decisions in all three states
studied here shows that even in an area of primitive communication and
transportation facilities, state court judges had extensive access to treatises
and decisions of jurists throughout the United States.282 Constant perusal of
materials from federal courts and other state courts during the course of their
duties, together with an inherent judicial bent in favor of order and legal
consistency, may have led state judges to defer to federal primacy on
constitutional issues more readily than their constituents. Unionist judges
placed on the Georgia bench during Reconstruction adhered to this path partly
out of tradition, partly out of personal sentiment, and perhaps partly because
as a practical matter, with federal authority victorious in the war, the state
28 3
could not afford to offend such authority as it rebuilt itself.
Wisconsin is a genuinely puzzling exception to the state judicial culture of
deference to federalism. One might try to explain the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's antifederalism by arguing that: (1) by the mid-1850s, the court, like its
constituents and many other Northerners, had come to believe that the spread
of slavery must be stopped by any means; (2) in the Booth case, the court saw
an opportunity to further this goal, saw states' rights and interposition as a
useful tool, and made the most of both; and (3) the emotional residue of the
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
other state
283.

See supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
See Padelford, Fay & Co. v. Mayor of Savannah, 14 Ga. 438, 445 (1854).
See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
For example, the state cases cited in this Article contain extensive citations to decisions of
courts, federal courts, British courts, and treatises.
See supra notes 232-51 and accompanying text
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Booth cases carried over to the court's postwar anti-federalist decisions.
Byron Paine's apologia in Knorr,284 particularly his allusion to the northern
states as a "hunting ground for fugitive slaves" before the war,285 provides
superficial support for this theory, but it must be remembered that after Paine
explained his past hatred of slavery in Knorr, he wrestled with the very issue
of whether his continuing belief in states' rights was because of anti-slavery
emotional residue, and he concluded it was not. 286 Was this self-delusion on
Paine's part? Chief Justice Ryan's opinion in Doyle suggests not. Even
though Ryan had been a leading federalist during the Booth controversy and
was at the opposite end of the political spectrum from Paine, he too had an
abiding concern about the rapid
advance of federalism and felt obligated to do
287
what he could to check it.
Wisconsin's efforts notwithstanding, the intellectual legitimacy of states'
rights and interposition doctrine was dealt a heavy blow in the war and died,
at least in the state judicial arena, with the United States Supreme Court's
Tarble and Whitton decisions.
Southern states resurrected the doctrine
temporarily in response to Brown v. Board of Education288 and the second
civil rights revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, but as before the Civil War,
states' rights were again advanced by state governors and legislators, not by
state courts.289 Strikingly, recent speculation that a new era of deference to
state powers and limitation of federal powers may be dawning has been based
on decisions of the United States Supreme Court, not of state courts. 2 90 If
such an era is beginning (and that is very much open to question),2 9' it would
present the paradox of states' rights being espoused by the very government
that states' rights was intended to check.292 There is little if any sign that state

284. Knorr v. Home Ins. Co. of N.Y., 25 Wis. 143, 152-54 (1869).
285. Id. at 153.
286. Id.
287. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text. The question also arises: Why was
Wisconsin the only Northern state that struck down the 1850 Act and used states' rights doctrine as
the tool to do this? Why didn't other Northern states follow suit, see supra note 54? The most
plausible answer is that individuals can sometimes turn the course of legal history: If Booth had
initially petitioned Justice Crawford instead of Justice Smith for a writ, his petition would have been
granted based only on defects in federal process, see supra note 70, and the Booth controversy might
never have happened. Smith's opinion clearly shows he wanted to strike a blow against slavery; he
realized Booth's petition presented a prime opportunity to do so, and he took advantage of that
opportunity. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text; see also Ranney, supra note 56, at 115.
288. 349 U.S. 294 (1954); see generally 11 BARTLEY, supra note 7, at 187-260.
289. 11 BARTLEY, supra note 7, at 187-260; JOHN EGERTON, SPEAK Now AGAINST THE DAY:
THE GENERATION BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE SouTH 621-27 (1994).

290. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
291. See id.
292. Sentiment for increased deference to state power has not been confined to conservatives
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courts are trying to revive states' rights as a major doctrinal tool: The tradition
of judicial deference to federalism and of judges who have a more nationalist
outlook than their constituents continues.

on the Rehnquist Court: In the mid-1980s, Justice William Brennan urged states to consider
interpreting the bill of rights provisions of their constitutions expansively as a counterbalance to
narrow federal judicial construction of civil and criminal rights. William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); see also, e.g.,
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1985); J. Skelly Wright, In Praise of State Courts:
Confessions of a FederalJudge, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1984).

